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(2).
of State could make or by anything less than diversion
of British troops from Shanghai.
I said if he genuinely wished His Majesty's Govern- ment to divert the troops from Shanghai he should give
me at once in writing the most complete possible assur- ances that nationalist government would not countenance
alteration of status of British concession and inter-
national settlements except by negotiation and added that uncertainty or qualified assurances would in this emergency prove of little value. He promised vaguely to furnish me with some statement of the kind.
I next asked if orders were issued to divert the
troops destined for Shanghai, he would at once sign agreement about Henkow and Kiukiang contained in my telegram No. 50; but he said he had now discovered
points in At which needed revision.
I then explained what he was asking His Majesty's Government to do was to place their faith at Shanghai
in further assurances from him in face of force and fraud practised upon us at Hankow and Kiukiang and while as yet he refused either to admit that the action of the Chinese during recent events at those places was in any way to blame or to take any definite steps to right the wrong we had suffered and make mutual
I would satisfactory arrangements for the future. report position to you but he must understand I was
not in a position to hold out any hope that His Majesty's Government would do as he wished. moment when Shanghai might become the refuge of beaten troops the scene of hostilities between two armies or the centre of en intense financial and industrial crisis and after all that had happened here I did not see how he could expect them to place themselves in his hands and to entrust large British interests and population in the settlement in a large measure in the safekeeping of the Cantonese soldiers.
At a
Repeated to Foreign Office, Tokyo, Canton, Hong- kong and Commander-in-Chief.
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